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The Theory
of the
Dynamic Erotic
Michael Karounos

n A Study of History Arnold Toynbee, characteri^es
"promiscuity" as the "triumph of the mass mind"
constituting "the uncritical acceptance of anything and
everything."' It seems only fitting that a paper purporting to define an
testhetic of eroticism at least be indiscreet in its method and discourse.
However, my critical borrowings from Burke, Kant, and Bataille—
though promiscuous—are not random as they provide a systematic
critical lexicon whose recombination will result in a definition of a
dynamic erotic which is roughly analogous to Kant's definition of the
dynamically sublime in Nature, to Burke's notion of the sublime as a
function of force, and to Bataille's aesthetic of loss.
The subject of eroticism in art and literature is a topic that has
acquired increasing critical interest as regards its peculiar tension
between the formality of eighteenth century society and its unusual
eruptions of political (French Revolution), social {Fable of the Bees), and
sexual (Marquis de Sade) expressions. The dichotomous aspect of this
valence (which I will argue exists in the erotic capacity as both subject
and object) is neatly expressed in Edmund Burke's Enquiry where Burke

' Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), 5:399.
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makes a groundbreaking distinction between the beautiful and the
sublime;
There is a wide difference between admiration and love. The
sublime, which is the cause of the former, always dwells on
great objects, and terrible; the latter on small ones, and
pleasing; we submit to what we admire, but we love what
submits to us; in one case we are forced, in the other we are
flattered into compliance.^
Burke introduces two significant advances in the discourse of
aesthetics. First, he separates the traditional subject-object dynamic in
the esthetic relationship by pointing out that although the subject acts
upon the object in the judgment of the beautiful, it is the object which
acts upon the subject in the judgment of the sublime. Second, he
introduces the concept of force. The point which I wish to make here
is that in testhetics the complex discourse of interestedness—the
relationship between the observer and the aesthetic event—defines our
responses to the beautiful and to the sublime. What is beautiful, what
is pleasing, what is lovable, "submits to us," in Burke's phrase, and we
take a reasoning, intellectual interest in it which yields to us its
use-value as an object. Kant makes a similar observation, "That which
gratifies a man is called pleasant; that which merely pleases him is
beautiful."' This entails the same idea that it is the subject which acts
upon the object, finds that it "pleases," and consequently judges it to be
beautiful. This formula articulates a subject-oriented understanding of
testhetics that began with Aristotle and his theory of imitation and
found its foundational expression in Longinus's Peri Hypsos* Con
versely, that which is sublime entails a discourse between the spectator
and the object which is not only interactive but also dangerous. The
force of the experience, as Burke indicates, is not merely a sensation, it
is a modification of the spectator's sense of Self by "power":

^Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry (Oxford, England; Oxford University Press, 1990),
103.
' Immanuel Kant, Critique ofjud^ent,trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951),
44.
* Interestingly, Plato's aesthetic judgment in Book X of the Republic is more concerned with the
object and recognizes its forceful effea on the moral life of the observer.

Dynamic Erotic

109

I know of nothing sublime which is not some modification of
power....And indeed the ideas of pain, and above all of death,
are so very affecting, that whilst we remain in the presence of
whatever is supposed to have the power of inflicting either
[suffering or enjoyment], it is impossible to be perfectly free
from terror.'
Kant's perspective agrees in regard to force (which he labels "might"),
but he approaches the subjective response from the perspective of
"resistance":
Volcanoes in all their violence of destruction; hurricanes with
their track of devastation; the boundless ocean in a state of
tumult...these exhibit our faculty of resistance as insignifi
cantly small in comparison with their might. But the sight of
them is the more attractive, the more fearful it is, provided
only that we are in security; and we willingly call these
objects sublime, because they raise the energies of the soul
above their accustomed height and discover in us a faculty of
resistance of a quite different kind.'
The dialectical interaction of "force" and "resistance" provides the
context for the ensuing discussion of the aesthetic of eroticism which,
of course, is predicated on some form of desire. In Burke, "desire" is a
subset of the beautiful but differs in the degree of its interestedness by
the intensification of the subject's response:
I likewise distinguish love, by which I mean that satisfaction
which arises to the mind upon contemplating anything
beautiful...from desire or lust; which is an energy of the mind,
that hurries us on to the possession of certain objects, that do
not affect us as they are beautiful, but by means altogether
different. We shall have a strong desire for a woman of no
remarkable beauty; whilst the greatest beauty in men, or in
other animals, though it causes love, yet excites nothing at all

' Burke, 59.
'Kant, 100.
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of desire. "Which shews that beauty, and the passion caused by
beauty, which I call love, is different from desire.''

The erotic event is not merely an experience like the beautiful
which "pleases," but is in fact a violation by force which overcomes the
moral resistance of the observer. Burke's and Kant's definition of the
beautiful depends upon the sensation of pleasure (whether that occurs
immediately, as in Burke, or upon reflection, as in Kant, is not
important here), while my definition of the sublime erotic, or what I
will call—after Kant—the dynamic erotic, is a departure from the
normative definition of the erotic. In the latter, which we may call the
beautiful erotic, the traditional subject-object relationship is expressed
by a one-way esthetic of pleasure and sensation.
For instance, people who enjoy reading pornographic novels or
enjoy looking at pornographic images may derive great pleasure from
those acts, but that pleasure is for them an experience of the beautiful
erotic and not of the dynamic erotic. The erotic event is passively
entered into and is not coerced. The willingness to indulge in that
behavior demonstrates a lack of resistance and consequently preempts
any possible violation by force. The response is thus always pleasing
(except when the pleasure is occasioned by pain which is a different
order of resistance), and results in a judgment of the beautiful erotic and
not of the dynamic erotic.
The dynamic erotic requires force (the erotic event) overcoming
resistance (the personal limits of morality). As expressed in the quotes
above, the "energy" of force, for Burke, is concentrated in the mind; for
Kant, the "energy" of resistance is concentrated in the soul. In fact, the
participation of both Reason and Understanding is required to
experience the dynamic erotic, and both need to transgress their
boundaries: Reason must violate its social conditioning and Under
standing must violate its moral "sense," what Kant calls "the presupposi
tion of the moral feeling in man," the "prerequisite for forming such
judgments."'
This brings us to the concept that I will call limit, which operates
on both Reason and Understanding. Any discussion of eroticism
'Burke, 83.
' Kant, XX.

Dynamic Erotic

111

necessarily entails a discussion of limits because eroticism is an effect
and an ssthetic that is produced by a tension between the desired
(object) and what is socially permissible (conduct), between the desiring
subject (the individual) and the restrictive body (society), between a
subject and object whose discourse is severely limited by social context
and by rational and moral contextualizations of the Self. Limit's
operation on Reason is what is traditionally meant by Taste and is what
motivates/constrains an individual's intellectual desire and comprehen
sion of the erotic. Of course, taste is socially constructed and entails all
of the understood complexities of race, class, and gender to name but
the most obvious factors in that process.
Limit's operation on the Understanding is in part socially
constructed and in part is natural to the individual. While the limit of
Reason (Taste) may be overcome through socialization, the limit of
Understanding (moral feeling) is more difficult to change and consti
tutes the faculty on which the dynamic erotic operates by force. The
limit of Reason may be modified to approve what was previously
thought to be ugly, or disgusting, or too loud, or too bright, or too sour
by a non-violent social means, but the limit of Understanding must be
overcome by an intellectual or a moral or a physical force which
simultaneously transgresses' the limits of both the Reason and the
Understanding. In extreme cases, this may occur with sadism (under
which heading I include rape) or masochism.
The idea of transgression as an action which violates moral and
rational limits is best understood in a Judeo-Christian context, but as
this approach is not critically en vogue we may (promiscuously) borrow
Georges Bataille's modified "transgression" and use it in a similar
fashion albeit for a different end. Bataille, as a result of his conversion
experience and his readings in Christian mysticism, adopted from
Catholicism'® the ideas of transgression and loss to explain—among
other behaviors—the erotic experience. Amy Hollywood observes:

' Compare to Kant: "The feeling of the sublime may appear, as regards its form, to violate
purpose in respect of the judgment...and as it were to do violence to the imagination" (83). The
sense of violence is present in Burke's force, Kant's sublime, and Bataille's transgression.
"Georges Bataille's Catholicism was always with him despite the overt tendencies otherwise
in his writings." In David O'Connell, Georges Bataille (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998),
1.
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Within Georges Bataille's texts of the late 1930s and 1940s, in
particular those later brought together in the tripartite
Atheological Summa, he repeatedly suggests that his primary
models for writing and experience are the texts of the Chris
tian and non-Western mystical traditions (often represented,
in Bataille, by women's writings) and those of Friedrich
Nietzsche.

Bataille was working out his system of atheology—reverencing the
sacred but without God—partly in the context of the phenomenology
of the erotic experience. Judith Surkis describes Bataille's version of
transgression as follows:
The vision of erotic transgression set forth in Erotism concen
trates on the experience of the "discontinuous subject" in his
attempt to transgress the limits of individual existence by
leaping or falling into the realm of continuity or limitless
being in order to access the zone of death."
The experience and motive that Bataille describes is radically
different from my purpose here, but the subject becomes "discontinu
ous" in the same way by transgressing the social and moral "limits of
individual existence." In this schema, since the beautiful erotic is an
endeavor that is willed by the individual, the individual and the event
can comfortably cohabit a social reality that is free of illicit tension and
guilt. There is no violent discontinuity. But the dynamic erotic operates
on the individual through a simultaneous and dissonant valence of
attraction and aversion. The individual transgresses against societal
strictures, against the rational limits of a socially-constructed identity,
and against the moral limits of the Understanding (Self). What gives the
dynamic erotic its particular piquancy is its quality as taboo. In this
context, Bataille writes, "At all costs we need to transcend [limits], but
we should like to transcend them and maintain them simultaneously."

"Judith Surkis, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity
in Bataille and Foucault. Available at http://www.phreebyrd.com/—sisyphus/ bataille/
xsurkis.html. 12/13/1998.
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Surkis, quoting Bataille in part, concisely captures the nuances of this
position:
The transgressive experience is thus organized and produced
by the imposition of a limit always existing in relation to it,
even and especially at the moment of its rupture. The
sensation of transgression is conditioned by a cognizance of
the taboo and is, as a result, fundamentally "duplicitous,"
performing "a reconciliation of what seems impossible to
reconcile, respect for the law and violation of the law.'^
One effect of the dynamic erotic is to fulfill the desire for what
Roger Shattuck calls "forbidden knowledge." This can be thought of in
Faustian terms (as a desire for power), in Oedipal terms (as a desire for
knowledge), in Pandoran terms (as a desire for the unknown), or as a
libido sciendi, a term that insists on the analogy between curiosity and
sexual desire."" (This connection between forbidden knowledge and the
erotic is a separate aspect of the erotic aesthetic which is not to the
purpose of the present discussion.)
Beyond the desire for "forbidden knowledge" is the individual's
experience of a dynamic erotic whose pleasure results in moral "loss."
Kant expresses a similar idea through the concept of "negative pleasure":
"The satisfaction of the sublime does not so much involve a positive
pleasure as admiration or respect, which rather deserves to be called
negative pleasure."" Forbidden knowledge only violates the dictum of
reason; it is a rational act in the same way that the beautiful erotic is.
However, the dynamic erotic is a violation of reason and moral nature.
For whether we are speaking in Christian or Bataillian terms, the loss
is undeniably moral. The reason for this is that the loss is not accidental
but necessitates a conscious sacrifice. Bataille writes:
Cults require a bloody wasting of men and animals in
sacrifice....From the very first, it appears that sacred things are
constituted by an operation of loss: in particular, the success

Surkis.
" Roger Shattuck, Forbidden Knowledge (New York; Harcourt Brace, 1996), 46.
"Kant, 83.
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of Christianity must be explained by the value of the theme
of the Son of God's ignominious crucifixion, which carries
human dread to a representation of loss and limitless degrada
tion.''

In terms of the dynamic erotic, the individual must make a
Bataillian "expenditure" whose cost is the moral loss (Kant's "negative
pleasure") occasioned by the experience. O'Connell writes, "The
economy of the expenditure is understood in Bataille's portrayal of
eroticism as the need to get beyond restrictions without eliminating
them, to express human vital energy, what Bataille would express as the
principle of human sovereignty."" To combine these unfamiliar
concepts for the sake of clarity, one may say that "transgression" is an
act which violates "due bounds or limits."''' This act results in an
"expenditure" whose price the subject willingly pays for the gain of the
erotic experience, which, the subject experiences as "loss" (or, in
religious terms, "sin"). Now, within the definition presented here, it is
important to remember that this loss does not occur in an encounter
with the beautiful erotic. The beautiful erotic results in a gain which is
both positive and pleasing. The object of the dynamic erotic is
self-abasement—the paradoxical gain of pleasure experienced as loss. The
loss that an individual experiences as a result of the dynamic erotic is
doubly negative in that it is willfully initiated. Bataille's term,
"expenditure," is a concept familiar to Shakespeareans from Sonnet
CXXIX: "The expense of spirit in a waste of shame / Is lust in action."
This sentiment represents the forceful imposition of an erotic esthetic
upon a moral sensibility, resulting in both gain (pleasure) and loss
(shame). Another useful term is one used by Mandeville in The Fable of
the Bees:
The greediness we have after the esteem of others, and the
raptures we enjoy in the thoughts of being liked, and perhaps
admired, are equivalents that over-pay the conquest of the
" George Bataille, "The Notion of Expenditure" in the Bataille Reader, eds. Fred Betting and
Scott Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 170.
" O'Connell, 65.
" As quoted in the electronic version of The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language, Third Edition Copyright (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994).
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strongest Passions, and consequently keep us as a great
Distance from all such Words or actions that can bring shame
upon us. The Passions we chiefly ought to hide for the
Happiness and Embellishment of the Society are Lust, Pride,
and Selfishness."
For Mandeville, an "equivalent" is the return we get from society
for restraining (i.e., not expending) our passions. But it would be equally
accurate to speak of the equivalent gain (beautiful erotic) or equivalent
loss (dynamic erotic) we get via the transgressive expenditure of our
passions. Mandeville's term is necessary for a better understanding of
the transactional aspect of the dynamic erotic which we will analyze in
select scenes from Pamela.

^ The Dynamic Erotic in Literature ^
The tension between conventional morality and unconventional sexual
expression was crucial to the formation of an esthetic of eroticism that
manifested itself in well-known works such as Pamela as well as in entire
genres such as Gothic and sentimental literature. Erotic pleasure is a
recurring subject of the painters and writers of the eighteenth century
and constituted an unusual composite of chaste and lascivious elements.
In literature, it used the most powerful tension of limit available in
English society: class differences. (In the United States, this limit is
represented by racial differences and finds its most violent expression in
the relation of slave-holders to their slaves.)
In the following example from literature, the moral erotic consists
in the desire to rape a "good" woman, manifested (in)famously by Mr.
B's obsession with Pamela in Richardson's novel. Although the subject
is not treated as graphically as in Pamela, the same topicis also explored
by Jane Austen in Mansfield Park where Henry Crawford conceives a
subversive sexual desire for Fanny Price where he expresses the
penetrating wish to make a small "hole in her heart."'' The dynamic
erotic occurs in these fictions when a powerful man becomes fascinated

" Jane Austen, Mansfield Park (London: Penguin, 1985), 79.
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with a woman of a lower class than himself. There are several compo
nents in this scenario. The woman must be poor because that condition
best expresses the social vulnerability which is attractive to the
predator, and she must be a "good girl" whose morality constitutes the
erotic currency of "equivalence." The man must be wealthy, but it
doesn't matter whether he is moral or not. By definition, he will not be;
all that matters is that he be convincingly powerful to exert the force
which will overcome not only his own social constraints but the
woman's moral and physical resistance. Whatever the nominal story
line of the novel, the eighteenth century reader is forced into an erotic
aesthetic that may violate his or her own social constraints. The erotic
moment captures the reader in the suspense of whether the villain will
succeed in stealing the woman's virginity and social standing. These are
commodities in a moral economy which determines not only the status
of an individual but her well-being. A woman deprived of her virtue
gets no equivalence from society excepting pity which she can't live on.
Thus, the metaphysical transaction of erotic expenditure and loss
translates into a potentially devastating physical one. The nexus of the
metaphysical erotic moment of pleasureand the physical social moment
of transgression is what transfixes the eighteenth-century reader in the
complicitous act of both enjoying and deploring such scenes.
The key scenes in Pamela occur when Mr. B. plunges his hand into
Pamela's bosom on four different occasions (42,67,163,176)." Since no
actual rape can occur if Pamela is to be preserved as a model of the
virtuous heroine, the penetration of her clothing doubles as a figurative
penetration of her body. That she faints twice can be construed as a
type of la petite morte in which the possibility of rape is just as effective
as the fact of it so long as it arouses the reader's suspicions.
As interesting as those series of incidents are from a narrative
perspective, they take on additional significance within the context of
the dynamic sublime. Mr. B. lusts after Pamela to such an extent that he
is willing to transgress the moral and class strictures which confer on
him his status. He feels conflicted by the thrilling prospect of violent
pleasure on the one hand and the cost of the moral expenditure on the
other. After an earlier incident he recognizes the fruitlessness of his
transgression and admits "I own I have demean'd myself" (35). His
" Samuel Richardson, Pamela (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971).
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regret, it is to be understood, is not in the attempt but in the failure. He
is "demean'd" (loss experienced as shame), without gain and conse
quently is compelled to continue in his attempts to rape Pamela in
order to recoup his expenditure.
In a subsequent interview, Mrs. Jervis pleads with Mr. B. that
Pamela has "a Value for her Reputation" (44). Pamela's "Value" (in the
Mandevillian sense of "equivalence"), andMr. B.'s "expenditure" (in the
sense of Bataille's erotic economy), are the nexus of this sexual/moral
tableau. Pamela's resistance paradoxically increases her value and the
rising conflict depends upon what extremes of moral expenditure Mr.
B. is willing to sacrifice in order to rape Pamela.
In letter xxv, he tries the silly ruse of hiding in her closet in a futile
attempt to rape her but succeeds only in fondling her: "I found his
Hand in my Bosom....I was ready to die; and I sighed, and scream'd, and
fainted "way" (67). The violence of dying, sighing, screaming, and
fainting expresses all that an unconsummated sexual and moral rape is
capable of. Once more, an apparently contrite Mr. B. says, "I had no
Business to demean myself so as to be in your Closet" (69). Once more,
he experienced an unsatisfactory expenditure that resulted in loss (being
demeaned).
After Pamela is abducted, Mr. B. makes a third attempt at a rape
in which Pamela is commodified: "Did you ever...see a more charming
Creature than this? Is it to be wonder'd at that I demean myself thus to
take Notice of her!...See, said he...What a Shape! what a Neck! what a
Hand! and what a Bloom in that lovely Face!"Such marketable features
represent a pecuniary value that he at last evaluates in solid currency.
For her body parts, he offers five hundred guineas, a small property,
and "four complete Suits of rich Cloaths, that you may appear with
Reputation, as if you was my wife" (162-66). The value of masquerad
ing as his wife is, of course, the greatest expenditure which he bestows
on her. The other items represent mere money, but "Reputation" is an
expenditure of social and moral capital which is more costly. Note
again, this third usage of "demean" in describing his attempts to violate
Pamela and that it is not she that is devalued, but himself.
Finally, after the last incident, we find a stunned Pamela sitting
upright in bed with her breasts exposed (177), improbably carrying on
a conversation with Mr. B. Her astonished state reveals that she is
already "raped," ravished by force in the sense that her modesty has
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been degraded and her hope of retaining her public virtue is severely
compromised.^" When Mrs. Jewkes lewdly suggests that Mr. B have his
way with her regardless, he grotesquely fondles her, causing Pamela to
faint again. She wakes for a second time to the uncertain knowledge of
whether Mr. B had penetrated her.
By repeating the same sequence of events, Richardson gratuitously
lures the reader and Pamela into thinking that she may have been
molested while unconscious. The reader's experience of that possibility
is complicated by the fact that Mr. B is handsome, wealthy, and landed.
His economic "power" enhances the esthetic of the dynamic erotic and
accentuates the disparity between his social force and Pamela's
vulnerability; consequently, this makes her a more "attractive" victim
of rape since she is a beautiful "object" which can be had, bought, and
discarded. The erotic attraction for Mr. B. lies not only in the obvious
disparity of power, but more tellingly in the obvious disparity of
"moral" sensuality. For Mr. B to rape a member of his own class would
be merely criminal; for Pamela to be raped by someone of her own class
would be merely criminal. But for Pamela to be raped by a member of
the landed class who recognizes himself to be "superior" (and thus more
culpable) to her in class but inferior to her in character distinguishes the
case as a moral as well as a legal infamy. To the penetration of her
physical, emotional, and intellectual person, he would add the penetra
tion of the ethical. As this would constitute the greatest harm of all in
terms of the moral esthetic, her escape horrifies the female reader but
® Pamela's stunned acquiescence to the gross violation of her moral and physical Self raises a
potentially controversial question as to whether it is possible for Pamela to experieilce an erotic
sensation in what—on the surface—is an erotic situation. Not only does Mr. B. feel it to be so,
but tellingly, so does Mrs. Jewkes. Ordinarily, moral striaures and conditioning would cause
a response of fear and revulsion. But since the dynamic erotic operates by force—particularly
in an interaaive sense between the subject and the object, as in de Sade—it is a dialectic that
could have potentially revisionist ramifications for traditionalinterpretations ofsexual violence.
De Sade's aesthetic is a double-edged sword that cuts in both directions and itself requires a
theoretical "limit," else the old violence against women becomes fashionably canonized in new
theoretical dress. One possible method to counter this pitfall is to use the terms of Burke's
aesthetic in which he argues that what constitutes aaual pain as opposed to the anticipation of
imminent pain cannot be a sublime experience. One can see, however, the seductive danger of
de Sade's aesthetic since pain qua pain is eroticized and the willingness or unwillingness of the
object is no longer an essential consideration: pain, in and of itself, is authenticated as an
experience equivalent tothe sublime or the beautiful. Under mydefinition, the unwilling object
of torture or rapecannot experiencethe dynamic erotic for the simple reason that transgression
requires self-volition and is not transferable unless it is willed.
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leaves her gratified that Pamela wasn't raped; while the male reader is
thrilled by the prospect and is probably secretly gratified that she was
handled. However, an actual rape would be too villainous for a moral
male reader to take pleasure in.
Richardson's genius was in realizing that he could express more
eroticism with the graphic description of a near rape (repeated several
times) than he could by merely alluding to an actual one. However, the
dynamic erotic is unfulfilled for Mr. B. since the transgression of social
and moral limits in this case requires sexual consummation. Although
the violence of overcoming those limits is a dynamic experience
involving expenditure and loss, the erotic act which confers "sover
eignty" is the gratification of the sexual desire. Interestingly, once
Pamela—despite her continued attraction to others—is no longer
"taboo" for Mr. B., the dynamic tension is nullified. What Bunuel called
the "obscure object of desire" is fatally illumined by domestication and
is no longer sublimely desirable. Social approbation is to the dynamic
erotic the chaste kiss of death. Familiarity breeds contempt because the
erotic connoisseur requires ever new sensations. The psychology of the
dynamic erotic is by nature consumptive and insatiable since it
inevitably destroys what it loves.

^ The Dynamic Erotic in Art ^
In the art of the period, the dynamic sublime is found in mythological
tableaux which mask forbidden sexual desires of voyeurism and rape. A
particularly well-known example is Fuseli's The Nightmare which
depicts an incubus sitting on the body of a sleeping woman. Her
abandoned posture suggests that she has just been or soon may be raped.
The selection of a gargoyle-like figure is intriguing since it requires the
male viewer to dehumanize himself if he wishes to complete the rape
fantasy. In that respect, the painting is a type of subversive eroticism.
One can even argue for it being a kind of dynamic erotic since the act
of identification requires a debasing exercise of will and desire. This
would necessitate a transgression of human boundaries by the observer
and an entry into the realm of the bestial.
Another type of the forbidden erotic is demonstrated by the
eroticism of necrophilia in Copley's Watson and the Shark. Like de
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Sade's essentialist asthetic of pain as pleasure, Copley's representation
of death as erotic is an exception to my schema of the dynamic and
beautiful erotic. Bataille does not shirk from death as erotic, but both
de Sade's and Bataille's aesthetic lack the solid foundation of Kantian
universalism which bestows on experience an authenticity which
transcends merely sensational conjectures. Eroticism in de Sade and in
the painting by Copley centers around the concept of terror and
victimization. The supine form of Watson suggests Fuseli's female
figure in Nightmare,while the shark is analogous to Fuseli's incubus in
that it is also a non-human, destructive ravisher. The grace and beauty
of the form belie the violent context, as well as the physical possibility
of maintaining such a pose in rough waters. For Copley, the pose is a
rhetorical device which expresses Lessing's "pregnant moment"^' and
also fulfills the requirements of the dynamic erotic in the one aspect of
limit.
Returning to literature and the depiction of woman as sculpture,
Steele (No. 266) writes of an erotic moment he experienced with a
prostitute. The moral pungency of the situation derives from his
evident attraction and simultaneous judgment of wrongdoing ("and to
avoid being seen with her I went away"). It is intriguing to observe that
the moral Steele's evaluation of the woman's parts echoes the inunoral
Mr. B.'s evaluation of Pamela. "We stood under one of the arches by
Twilight; and there I could observe as exact Features as I had ever seen,
the most agreeable shape, the finest Neck and Bosom, in a Word, the
whole Person of a Woman exquisitely beautiful." It is at this critical
juncture of morality and immorality where character—as Aristotle
might say—is revealed. Such a compelling temptation might have led
Steele to experience transgression and the gain/loss of the dynamic
erotic. A man of his class without moral limit would not have hesitated
to purchase for use the beautiful parts of the woman before him. That
he did not is to his credit. In a like situation, de Quincey also resisted
a similar temptation. Steele's expenditure in this instance was time and
conscience: he indulged a sexual desire to stare at her body but he
compensated by purchasing the moment with the guilt-ridden gift of a
"Crown" [coin].

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocodn (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), viii.
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Steele's sensitivity is plainly reflected in his account, as is the
insensitivity of the age since he overcomes his temptation and reinscribes her as a "whole" woman who is also "beautiful" and not merely
desirable. Reading between the Unes, we find he accomplishes two tasks
in this short piece: first, he paints a sympathetic portrait of the
prostitute; but more importantly, he restores her fallen nature to a level
of moraUty equal to or perhaps even superior to the "over-offended"
ladies whom he is trying to reform into compassion: "No Vice or
Wickedness, which People fall into from Indulgence to Desires which
are natural to all, ought to place them below the Compassion of the
virtuous Part of the World; which indeed often makes me a little apt to
suspect the Sincerity of their Virtue, who are too warmly provoked at
other Peoples personal Sins."^^ By imbuing the merely sensual with a
respectable and even spiritual morality, Steele creates an erotic aesthetic
whose keen attraction he obviously felt but perhaps didn't entirely
comprehend. The attraction caused a momentary "discontinuity" of
forbidden attraction, but it did not lead to a physical transgression,
which is something after all.
Though it is impossible to discuss in a brief space all the possibili
ties of interpretation available in such a complex subject matter, it is
evident from even these few samples that eighteenth-century eroticism
percolated under immense societal pressure. The stronger the con
straints, the more powerful the form of deviation was tempted to be.
Burke, in his Enquiry, recognizes that we can find even morally
unbeautiful things attractive, whether of sensation or depiction.^^ His
idea of "possession" is corroborated by the distinction that he makes
between admiration and love.^"* Women (and sometimes men) as
possessions—in various attitudes and circumstances of mourning,
supiness, and captivity—are in fact the "objects" of desire whose
submission the eighteenth century thrilled to dream about in paintings
and literature. As concerns the eighteenth-century spectator, we would
agree with Burke whose complex critique comprises the elements of
power, pleasure, lust, and beauty: "For pleasure," he wrote, "must be

Richard Steele and Joseph Addison, Selections from the Tatler and Spectator, ed. Angus Ross
(London: Penguin, 1988), 266.
" Burke, 83.
" Burke, 103.
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stolen, and not forced upon us."^' Whether forcefully (dynamic erotic)
or passively (beautiful erotic), in these images and scenes of the period's
art and literature every effort is made to steal as much ambivalent
pleasure as possible, a guilty pleasure imposed by force, enjoyed with
shame, and paid for with costs of conscience and character. This kind
of pleasure, as Shakespeare wisely observed, is "A bliss in proof—and
proved, a very woe."

' Burke, 60.

